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RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTs-LANDLORD

AND

TENANT.-The landlord, respon-

dent, was awarded possession of the premises known as the Belasco
Theatre in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, upon the
theory that the tenant held over after forfeiture for breach of a provision in the lease whereby the tenant gave the landlord the option, at
any time "to book the demised premises from the tenant upon the
usual and customary terms of booking arrangements prevailing in the
theatrical industry". The tenant breached this agreement but contends that even if the option providing for the right to book the premises "upon the usual and customary terms of booking arrangements in
the theatrical industry" is not too indefinite or vague in itself to be
enforceable, it -was required to be supported by proof showing the
existence in the theatrical industry in New York of fixed and invariable terms applicable to all theatre bookings. Held, reversed and
petition dismissed. It was improper to award a final order of dispossess when there was no proof showing the existence in the theatrical industry in New York of fixed and invariable terms applicable to
all theatre bookings. To establish merely a range with minimum and
maximum figures within which the parties could negotiate, does not
meet the test of definitefiess essential to establish an enforceable contract. Belasco Theatre Corp. v. Jelin Productions, Inc., 270 App.
Div. 202, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 42 (1st Dep't 1945).
The Appellate Division found that the evidence produced in the
trial court did not conclusively show that there existed, in the theatrical industry in New York, uniform and unvarying terms of booking
arrangements. The evidence established that the financial terms of
booking arrangements varied in many appreciable respects, and that
they were required to be the subject of negotiation. Therefore, the
option amounted to nothing more than an agreement to make a future
agreement and an agreement to agree is not enforceable.1
As to customs and usages, it has been said that custom is such
usage as has acquired the force of law. 2 In order to become part of
a contract a custom must be so far established, and so far known to
the parties, that it is supposed that their contract was made in reference to it. For this purpose the custom must be established, uniform,
general, and known to the parties.3 The testimony of experts in the
trade in which the custom is alleged to exist must amount to a clear

I St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hasting Paper Co., 235 N. Y. 30, 138
N. E. 495 (1923).
2Matter of Gerseta Corp. v. Silk Ass'n of America, 220 App. Div. 293,
222 N. Y. Supp. 11 (1st Dep't 1927).
3 Sipperly v. Stewart, 50 Barb. 62, 68 (N. Y. 1867).
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statement of the existence in that trade of a custom so general, uniform, and unvarying as to furnish a fixed and4 definite standard by
which to ascertain the intention of the parties.
It has been held that where an agreement is indefinite or incomplete in respect to one or more of its vital terms, and is still executory,
generally no recovery can be had for its breach. 5 Terms of an agreement must be definite and complete. For if they are not, there is only
an indefinite obligation to be performed, and in the case of legal dispute arising therefrom, .there is no way for the court to determine
what the parties' obligations are, or whether they have been properly
performed. The court can not and will not make a contract for the
parties if they have failed to make their agreement definite and
complete.6
B. H. A.
FEDERAL-STATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN FEDERAL EQUITY

SuITs.-The petitioners are creditors of a joint-stock land bank which
closed its doors in 1932; the respondent was a shareholder of that
bank. Eleven years after the bank closed, the petitioners learned that
Jules S. Bache had concealed his ownership of one hundred shares of
the stock under the name of the respondent. Suit was brought in
the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of
New York against the respondent and Bache to enforce the liability
imposed upon shareholders of the bank by § 16 of the Federal Farm
Loan Act which imposed upon shareholders a liability of one hundred
per cent of their holdings for all contracts, debts and engagements of
the bank. As defenses the respondents set up the statute of limitations of New York and laches. Held, for petitioners. Where the
action is to enforce a federal right, the federal statute of limitations
and not the state statute applies. Where a plaintiff has been injured
by fraud and has used reasonable diligence to ascertain the truth, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered. Holmberg v. Ambrecht, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 590 (1946).
The respondent, relying upon Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,1 contended that the New York statute of limitations 2 was controlling and
that the mere lapse of ten years had barred the action. The court,
however, distinguished and limited the York case. The York case
was a case brought into federal court merely because of diversity of
citizenship. It was a case involving a state-created right, and for
4 Wise & Co., Inc. v. Wecoline Products, Inc., 286 N. Y. 365, 36 N. E. (2d)
623 (1941).
5 Fairplay School Township v. O'Neal, 127 Ind. 95, 26 N. E. 686 (1891).
6 WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) § 19.

1326 U. S. 99, 89 L. ed. 2079 (1945).
2
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 53---"An action, the limitation of which is not
specifically prescribed in this article, must be commenced within -ten years after
the cause of action accrues."

